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adopt Ford's argument. Instead,
the Third Circuit found that imposing liability on the basis of
Ford's failure to install protective
netting would not undermine the
options under Standard 208. Reasoning that the purpose of the
Safety Act was to promote safety,
the court determined that neither
Congress nor the Department of
Transportation intended an allinclusive schedule which would
effectively "freeze" developments
and improvements in safety design. Consequently, the court held
that Pokorny's claim against Ford
for the manufacturer's failure to
equip the van with protective netting over the windows was not
preempted. The court of appeals
remanded the protective netting
claim to the district court.
Linda J. Urbanik

MANUFACTURER OF
BOARD GAME NOT
LIABLE FOR SUICIDE
OF PLAYER
In Watters v. TSR, Inc., a/k/a
TSR Hobbies, Inc., 904 F.2d 378
(6th Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that a manufacturer of
a board game could not be held
liable under Kentucky negligence
law for the suicide of an avid
player of the game. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision to grant summary judgment for the manufacturer of the
board game. The court of appeals
determined that the manufacturer
of the board game had no reason to
foresee that certain players of the
game would be more susceptible to
murder or suicide than non-players.
Background
Sheila Watters ("Watters")
brought a wrongful death action
against TSR, Inc. ("TSR") for the
suicide of her son, Johnny Burnett
("Johnny"). Johnny, a devoted
"Dungeons and Dragons" player,
died due to a self-inflicted gunshot
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wound. Manufactured by TSR,
Dungeons and Dragons is a game
in which players assume various
characters' roles in imaginary ancient world "adventures," as illustrated in the TSR booklets. A
player known as the "Dungeon
Master" narrates the adventures.
Encounters between the players
depend on the roll of the dice in
conjunction with tables provided
in the manufacturer's published
materials.
Dungeons and Dragons does not
require the players to act out roles
physically. The record in the present case did not indicate that the
game's materials glorified or encouraged suicide or that the materials alluded to guns. In addition,
both schools and libraries used the
game as a learning tool and as a
means to encourage creativity.
TSR's records indicated that the
company had sold more than a
million games at the time of Watters' wrongful death action. These
sales figures did not include sales
by other companies which produced and sold similar role-playing
games.
According to Watters, Johnny
and his friends played Dungeons
and Dragons constantly after
school and on weekends for several
years. Watters claimed that Johnny's continuous exposure to the
game caused him to lose control of
his will and forced him to kill
himself.
District Court
In her complaint, Watters alleged that TSR violated its duty of
ordinary care by disseminating
Dungeons and Dragons literature
and materials and violated its duty
to warn that fragile-minded children who played the game might
suffer psychological harm and loss
of control of their mental processes. In addition, Watters alleged
that TSR's actions directly and
proximately caused her son's
death. In support of her claim,
Watters only submitted an affidavit which stated that she had read
in many publications about the
dangerous propensities of the Dungeons and Dragons game.

After the case was removed to
the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky on
the basis of diversity of citizenship,
TSR moved for summary judgment on several grounds. First,
TSR argued that the first amendment, as incorporated through the
fourteenth amendment, precluded
a Kentucky court from finding
TSR liable on the basis of what the
company published. TSR also asserted that it had no obligation to
cease distributing the game or to
warn players of its possible dangers. Finally, TSR argued that
Johnny's suicide was a superseding
or intervening cause of his death.
The district court granted TSR's
motion for summary judgment.
The court rested its decision on
first amendment grounds without
deciding any of the state law negligence issues including breaches of
duty for disseminating the game
and for failure to warn of the
games' dangerous propensities.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Based on the general principle
that courts will not anticipate constitutional questions, the Sixth Circuit determined it did not need to
reach the constitutional arguments
in order to decide Watter's appeal.
Despite the fact that the constitutional question was the only one
argued by the parties on appeal, the
court decided that the briefs filed
at the district level adequately addressed the underlying common
law issues. The court found that
although there was no Kentucky
case law directly on point, the
principles governing the case were
sufficiently clear.
Under Kentucky negligence law,
there is actionable negligence
where a duty has been breached,
and the breach results in an injury.
According to the law, each person
must exercise ordinary care and
prevent foreseeable injury to others. The court highlighted the fundamental principle that usually liability does not exist without fault.
The court noted that no courts had
extended the doctrine of strict liability, which allows for liability
(continued on page 26)
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without fault, to words or pictures.
Thus, Watters could not recover
damages without proof that TSR
violated its duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent foreseeable
injury.
The court first addressed Watters' argument that TSR was at
fault for putting Dungeons and
Dragons on the market without
attempting to ascertain the mental
conditions of prospective players.
The court held that TSR did not
fail to exercise ordinary care since
the only method of guaranteeing
that Dungeons and Dragons would
not reach "mentally fragile" individuals would be to stop its sales of
the game entirely.
Next the court of appeals addressed Watters' contention that
TSR breached a duty to warn of the
possible consequences of playing
the game, including a player's loss
of control of mental processes.
Under Kentucky law, manufacturers and suppliers have a general
duty to warn of dangers known to
them but not known to anticipated
users of the product. Though it
determined that Johnny was one of
the class of persons whose use of
the game could have been reasonably anticipated, the court found
Watters failed to prove TSR could
have foreseen Johnny's suicide.
According to the court, TSR's
motion for summary judgment required Watters to cite specific facts
showing that TSR possessed
knowledge of a danger which made
Johnny's death foreseeable. In her
affidavit, however, Watters admitted only to reading publications
which discussed the dangerous
propensities of the game. She described her son as well-behaved
throughout the period when he
regularly played Dungeons and
Dragons with his friends. The
court reasoned that if Johnny's
mother could not foresee the suicide, TSR could not be expected to
foresee the boy's death either.
In addition, the court concluded
that, based on the content of the
materials which accompanied the

game, TSR would not have been
able to foresee that players of the
game would be more susceptible to
suicide than non-players. The
court compared the violence and
depravity of television and movies
to which children are exposed with
the "let's pretend" nature of Dungeons and Dragons. The court
found that Dungeons and Dragons
only required a player to imagine a
fanciful world; this mythological
world was not based on suicide or
cruelty. The court noted that no
Kentucky case law existed which
placed a duty to warn on television
networks and book publishers with
respect to creative works which
might be linked to anti-social behavior. Furthermore, the only case
law on point supported TSR's first
amendment argument. Moreover,
there had never been a similar
claim against producers and publishers for the actions of persons
allegedly prompted by watching
television shows and reading magazines where there was no direct
incitement to act. In the absence of
specific facts indicating that TSR's
game was in fact dangerous or that
TSR had knowledge of any danger
with respect to the game and its
effect on players, Watters failed to
sustain her cause of action.
Lastly, the court of appeals considered Watters' assertion that
TSR's manufacturing and sale of
Dungeons and Dragons proximately caused her son's death. According to the court, there cannot be
liability in a negligence action if
the negligence did not cause the
injury. The court recognized that
under Kentucky law, unforeseeable, extraordinary actions may
interrupt the chain of causation. In
this case, the court held that Johnny's suicide was an unforeseeable
and intervening act.
Although exceptions to the general rule that suicide constitutes an
independent and intervening act
do exist, such as in the area of
worker's compensation or in a situation where someone with suicidal
tendencies is placed in the care of a
custodian, the court found that
Watters failed to present facts suggesting Johnny's suicide fit into
either exception. There was no

evidence that Johnny suffered
from psychosis or had suicidal tendencies. Thus, the court concluded
that whether Johnny would not
have shot himself had he not constantly played Dungeons and Dragons was open to speculation.
The Sixth Circuit held that Watters had failed to establish there
was a genuine issue for trial under
the standards of Kentucky negligence law. Therefore, the court of
appeals affirmed the district
court's decision to grant TSR's
motion for summary judgment.
Elizabeth Barnes

AN "AS IS" CLAUSE IN
A DEED OF
CONVEYANCE DOES
NOT PROTECT
RESPONSIBLE
PARTIES AGAINST
STRICT LIABILITY FOR
CLEANUP COSTS
UNDER CERCLA
In Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp.
v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957
(N.D.Cal. 1990), the United States
District Court for the Northern
District of California held that a
former property owner who disposed of hazardous wastes on
property sold could not rely upon
an "as is" provision in the deed to
the contaminated property to escape strict liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 &
Supp. 1988).
Background
On May 23, 1975, NL Industries, Inc. ("NL") sold twentythree acres of property in California to Wiegmann & Rose Machine
Works ("Wiegmann"). In September 1985, Wiegmann sold all of its
stock to Wiegmann & Rose International Corporation ("W & R").
NL alleged that the deed conveyed
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